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I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the general theme of this volume, I begin my contribution by noting 
that I have always been skeptical of the strong forms of the convergence thesis in 
comparative law. That is, I doubt that the differences between civil law and common law 
are crumbling, soon to be confined to the dustbin of history, or that the legal systems 
across the world will shortly be left with few distinctive characteristics.1 Of course, there 
is bound to be some convergence of rules and approaches across legal cultures as various 
forms of international interaction increase. Transnational actors, power politics, and 
exposure to foreign approaches, among other things, all may cause a legal system to 
                                                                                                                                                 
* Associate Professor, University of Akron School of Law. All translations are my own. 
1 See e.g. B.S. Markesinis, ed., The Gradual Convergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); 
Ugo A. Mattei, Luisa Antonioli & Andrea Rossato, “Comparative Law and Economics” in Boudewijn 
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds., Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. 1 (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2000) 505, at 508-14. 
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adopt solutions and approaches from abroad.2  But there are likely to be plenty of 
countervailing causal processes at work in law reform, and civil procedure reform is no 
exception.3 Moreover, as Alan Watson’s work nicely demonstrates, there have been 
whole-scale legal transplants long before the advent of globalization.4 Thus, the presence 
of transplants in procedural reform does not necessarily indicate that we are inevitably 
moving towards convergence. 
I also think, however, that the differences between civil law and common law 
procedure have frequently been overdrawn. Juxtaposing the two systems provides many 
insights, to be sure. Civil law and common law countries, respectively, share a 
considerable history of ideas, concepts, and institutions. That common history, however, 
is not equally strong in all countries, and it began to diverge at various points in time for 
different jurisdictions.5 Moreover, the advent of the constitutional state and, later, the 
modern welfare state brought with it other formative influences, some of which are 
shared across the civil law / common law divide.6
From this perspective, it should come as no surprise that the current procedural 
reform project in Switzerland—the creation of the first Federal Code of Civil Procedure 
in Swiss history—shows few signs of bringing Swiss civil procedure, traditionally seen as 
part of the civil law family, any closer to common law concepts and approaches. The 
thrust of the reform has been to create a single, unified code of civil procedure by 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Cf. Samuel P. Baumgartner, “Transnational Litigation in the United States: The Emergence of a 
New Field of Law” (book review essay) (2007) 55 Am. J. Comp. L. 793, at 799-801. 
3 See e.g. Ralf Michaels, “Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction” (2007) 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1003. 
4 See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed. (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1993). 
5 See e.g. Rudolf B. Schlesinger et al., Comparative Law, 6th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 
1998), at 257-63, 281, 283-313. 
6 See e.g. William B. Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?” 
(1995) 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1889, at 1987-88, 2046-65. 
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combining the best features from the various cantonal codes.7 Foreign rules and 
approaches, however, have remained largely off the table. 
In this chapter, I shall paint the landscape of procedural reform in Switzerland and 
use the product of that effort to inquire into the reasons why the reformers in that country 
chose to forego virtually any adoption of foreign concepts or approaches, whether from 
civil law or common law origins. In doing so, I hope to contribute to our understanding of 
the forces that oppose, as well as the forces that promote, convergence in procedural 
reform. 
II. THE CURRENT REFORM EFFORT AND ITS BACKGROUND 
The current civil procedure reform in Switzerland is part of a much larger package to 
reform procedural law and the federal judiciary. This package includes the creation, for 
the first time in Swiss history, of a federal code of civil procedure, a federal code of 
criminal procedure, a lower federal criminal court, and a lower federal administrative 
court.8 This is quite an extensive reform package by any standard. Although many of 
these reforms have been proposed for a very long time, they never came to fruition. 
Change finally arrived in 2000, however, with the strong vote of the Swiss populace in 
favor of a constitutional amendment giving the federal government the power to 
implement the above-mentioned reforms.9 Such popular support in favor of federal power 
in this area is a relatively new phenomenon, however. 
Since 1848, Switzerland has been a parliamentary democracy with a federal form of 
government. Governmental power is shared by the federal government and the twenty-six 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 See e.g. Christoph Leuenberger, “Die neue schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung” in Thomas 
Geiser et al., eds., Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen des Wirtschaftsstandortes Schweiz (Zürich: Dike, 2007) 
601, at 602 [Geiser et al., Rahmenbedingungen]. 
8 See “Justizreform” in Bundesamt für Justiz, online: 
<http://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/de/home/themen/staat_und_buerger/gesetzgebung/justizreform.html> 
[“Justizreform”]. 
9 Ibid. 
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cantons (or states). The 1848 Constitution provided for relatively little federal power 
outside of foreign affairs, monetary policy, and tariffs.10 But various groups, encouraged 
by nationalist events in neighboring Germany and Italy, soon proposed the adoption of a 
new constitution that would have significantly increased the areas of federal power—
including in criminal and private law and procedure.11 However, the proposal was 
rejected by popular vote in 1872, due to opposition in both conservative catholic and anti-
federalist French-speaking cantons.12 A scaled-back proposal for a new constitution with 
only modest increases in federal powers was adopted in 1874 and amended in 1898. 
Since then, substantive private law and criminal law have been a matter of federal 
legislative power.13 Civil and criminal procedure and the organization of the courts, on 
the other hand, remained the province of state law.14 Moreover, the federal judiciary has 
been limited to a federal Supreme Court, which acts as a limited constitutional court and 
as a final arbiter on questions of substantive federal law.15
Not surprisingly, the resulting differences in civil procedure and court organization in 
the various cantons produced difficulties in the quickly growing class of cases that cross 
state borders. Hence, attempts to introduce a unified national system of civil procedure 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (September 12, 1848), reproduced in 
Wilhelm Fetscherin, ed., Repertorium der Abschiede der Eidgenössischen Tagsatzungen aus den Jahren 
1814-1848, vol. 2, 764 (Bern: K.J. Wyss, 1876), arts. 13-59. 
11 See e.g. Thomas Sutter, Auf dem Weg zur Rechtseinheit im schweizerischen Zivilprozessrecht 
(Zürich: Schulthess, 1998), at 4-38. 
12 See e.g. Ulrich Häfelin & Walter Haller, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 2d ed. (Zürich: 
Schulthess, 1988), at 17. 
13 See Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (May 29, 1874), AS 1, 1 (1875), 
art. 64  (providing for federal power in some areas of private law, including the law of obligations and 
intellectual property); Constitution of 1874, as amended on November 13, 1898, AS 16, 885, 888 (1898) 
arts. 64(II) & 64bis(I) (providing for federal power in all areas of substantive private and criminal law). 
14 Ibid., arts. 64(III) & 64bis(II). There is one important exception: The procedure for enforcing 
money judgments and uncontested monetary claims, including bankruptcy law, was a matter of federal law 
as well. See art. 64(I). 
15 Ibid., arts. 110-114. The role of the Court as a constitutional court is limited primarily because of 
its inability to declare federal statutes void as unconstitutional. See art. 113(III). 
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were made on a number of occasions. None of them, however, came to fruition. The 
rejection of the 1872 proposal cast a long shadow.16 Moreover, straw polls among 
various bar groups over time indicated that judges and litigators quite liked the existing 
system with different procedural rules in different cantons.17
Another problem that soon manifested itself was the lack of uniformity in enforcing 
federal substantive law. As proceduralists across the globe know, there is no clear 
dividing line between substantive and procedural law, and avowedly procedural rules 
frequently have substantive consequences.18 The Federal Supreme Court thus began a 
slow but steady process of creating federal common law in the guise of ensuring uniform 
application of federal substantive law. By the end of that process, the Court had managed 
to declare many a traditional area of state procedure entirely a matter of federal 
substantive law, including res judicata, lis pendens, declaratory and preliminary relief, 
and group litigation rights.19 Catching on to the problem, the federal legislature began to 
adopt traditionally procedural rules in federal substantive legislation, most prominently 
rules on personal jurisdiction, burden of proof, evidence, costs, and speed of 
proceedings.20 This proliferation of federal rules accelerated during the second half of the 
twentieth century, culminating in the adoption of a new federal Act on Private 
International Law21 in 1987. In that Act, federal lawmakers adopted an exhaustive set of 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 See e.g. Sutter, supra note 11, at 55-72. 
17 See e.g. Frank, Sträuli & Messmer, Kommentar zur Zürcherischen ZPO, 3d ed. (Zürich: 
Schulthess, 1997), at 13; ibid., at 62. 
18 See e.g. Stephen B. Burbank, “Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and 
Hypocrisy” (2006) 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1924, at 1926-27. 
19 See e.g. Oscar Vogel & Karl Spühler, Grundriss des Zivilprozessrechts, 8th ed. (Bern: Stämpfli, 
2006), at 68-71; Stephen Berti, Zum Einfluss ungeschriebenen Bundesrechts auf den kantonalen 
Zivilprozess im Lichte der Rechtsprechung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts (Zürich: Schulthess, 1989). 
Regarding group litigation rights, see e.g. Samuel P. Baumgartner, “Class Actions and Group Litigation in 
Switzerland” (2006) 27 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 301, at 316-26 [Baumgartner, “Class Actions”]. 
20 See e.g. Vogel & Spühler, ibid., at 62-67. 
21 Bundesgesetz über das internationale Privatrecht of December 18, 1987, SR 291 [Private 
International Law Act].  
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rules on personal jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
in international cases, in addition to a new choice of law regime. 
By the late 1980s, it was clear to any Swiss lawyer that there was, in fact, a 
substantial body of federal procedural law. Apart from the question whether the 
constitutional preservation of the power to make procedural law for the states had been 
undermined, this had significantly weakened the argument that an adoption of federal 
procedural rules was neither feasible nor necessary.22 But it took the ratification of the 
Lugano Convention23 to precipitate change. The Lugano Convention sets uniform rules 
on personal jurisdiction, lis pendens, and the recognition of judgments in cross-border 
cases involving EC and EFTA member states. Ratification of the Lugano Convention had 
the jarring effect that, in some situations, cantonal courts were required to treat foreign 
litigants better than litigants from other cantons.24 Moreover, the adoption of the Lugano 
Convention and the new Private International Law Act further increased the difficulty for 
litigants to locate the applicable procedural law in the thicket of international treaties, 
proliferating federal statutes, state civil procedure codes, federal common law, and state 
practice.25 The clear vote in favor of an updated and streamlined federal constitution by 
the Swiss populace in 1998 gave the final impetus to put before the people a 
constitutional amendment providing for federal power in civil and criminal procedure. 
That amendment was adopted in 2000.26
Given the experience with the Lugano Convention, the first piece of federal 
legislation passed under the new federal power was an act that entirely federalized the 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 See e.g. Frank, Sträuli & Messmer, supra note 17, at 15-16. 
23 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
1988 O.J. (L 319) 40 [Lugano Convention]. 
24 See e.g. Frank, Sträuli & Messmer, supra note 17, at 16. 
25 See e.g. Adrian Staehelin, Daniel Staehlin & Pascal Grolimund, Zivilprozessrecht (Zürich: 
Schulthess, 2008), at 15; Fridolin M.R. Walther, Die Auslegung des schweizerischen Zivilprozessrechts, 
insbesondere des Bundesgesetzes über den Gerichtsstand in Zivilsachen (Bern: Stämpfli, 2002), at 132-33. 
26 See supra text accompanying note 8. 
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law of personal jurisdiction.27 In addition, the Justice Department impaneled a committee 
of experts to draft a new federal code of civil procedure. The Committee presented its 
work product in June of 2003.28 After a public comment period, the Federal Council (the 
executive) presented an adapted version of the Committee’s draft to Parliament. 
Parliament adopted the final version of the Code on December 19, 2008.29 The deadline 
for a possible referendum passed on April 16, 2009. Thus, the new Code is planned to 
enter into force in January of 2011. 
III. THE NEW CODE 
From the beginning, the Committee’s primary task was to create a code of civil 
procedure that would break the long spell of shipwrecked unification proposals. The 
Justice Department thus carefully selected committee members to ensure representation 
from bench and bar as well as from academia; from small firms as well as from large; 
from French- and Italian-speaking regions as well as from German; from Catholic as well 
as from Protestant areas; and so on. Accordingly, the Committee never considered 
adopting truly novel approaches—including foreign ones—that would not mesh easily 
with traditional Swiss procedural concepts.30 Similarly, the Committee knew better than 
to model its work on the code of a single canton. Instead, it attempted to draw from all 
cantonal codes of civil procedure, although more so from the recently reformed ones.31 In 
addition, the Committee decided to restate the federal statutory and common law rules 
that had developed over time to preempt state procedural law in domestic cases.32
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Bundesgesetz über den Gerichtsstand in Zivilsachen of March 24, 2001, SR 272.  
28 See Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), Bericht zum Vorentwurf der 
Expertenkommission, June 2003, online: 
<http://www.bj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/staat_buerger/gesetzgebung/zivilprozess.Par.0006.File.tmp/vn-
ber-d.pdf>, at 6 [Begleitbericht].  
29 Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung of December 19, 2008, BBl 2009, at 21 [ZPO or Code].  
30 See Begleitbericht, supra note 28, at 15. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See e.g. Hans-Peter Walter, “Auf dem Weg zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung” (2004) 100 
Schweizerische Juristenzeitung 313, at 319. On those rules, see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
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The end result, after adoption by Parliament, is a Code that should look familiar to all 
Swiss lawyers, although they may find surprises in the details. With 408 relatively brief 
articles, the Code is considerably shorter than its counterparts in surrounding countries. It 
achieves this, in true Swiss tradition,33 by eschewing much technical language and 
complex conceptual elaboration, as well as by leaving various details for practice to 
develop. 
The Code begins with a general part, specifying the scope of application and dealing 
with issues common to all kinds of proceedings, such as personal jurisdiction in domestic 
(as opposed to transnational) cases; recusal; joinder of parties and claims; calculation of 
amount in controversy; rules on costs; and general rules on conducting the proceedings 
and on taking evidence.34 The Code then contains rules on ordinary proceedings, which 
begin with a written complaint and answer, followed by a preliminary hearing, a full-
fledged main hearing, and judgment.35 Following that, there are provisions for a number 
of special proceedings. These include simple (e.g., less formal, more oral) proceedings 
for amounts in controversy of sFr. 30,000 (approximately US $25,000) or less; summary 
proceedings (e.g., for preliminary relief), in which only certain kinds of evidence are 
permitted or in which there is a lower standard of proof, or both; and family law 
proceedings, where the Code abandons many of its underlying classical liberal concepts 
in favor of increased judicial supervision in order to ensure equal treatment of the 
potentially weaker party.36 The Code then contains rules on appeals and enforcement 
proceedings,37 although the enforcement of money judgments remains the province of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 See e.g. Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe, trans. by Tony Weir (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) at 389-91. 
34 ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 1-196. 
35 Ibid., arts. 197-242. 
36 Ibid., arts. 243-307. 
37 Ibid., arts. 308-52. 
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much older federal law on debtor/creditor relations and bankruptcy.38 Finally, there is a 
chapter on domestic arbitration.39
The drafters ensured that the new Code complies with international treaties ratified 
by Switzerland, including several Hague Conventions and, most importantly, the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, some rights of the parties are more clearly 
defined under the Code than they may currently be in cantonal practice. For instance, the 
Code states a right of the parties to prove their respective cases,40 as well as a privilege 
against self-incrimination.41 Similarly, the judge will be obligated to disregard illegally 
obtained evidence unless she considers the interest in finding the truth to prevail.42
Apart from these clarifications required by international law, however, there are only 
two foreign imports in the Code. The first is a brief chapter on party- and judge-initiated 
mediation that was added to the Committee’s proposed draft upon heavy lobbying by 
mediation firms from large cities.43 The second is inspired by a provision in the Lugano 
Convention, itself based on procedures known in a number of European countries: the 
parties to a contract can have a promissory note drawn up and authenticated by a notary 
(a specialized lawyer in Switzerland).44 The resulting note is enforceable like a court 
judgment, except that a few narrow defenses are permitted.45 On the other hand, a request 
by a few members of Parliament to consider the introduction of class actions for labor, 
landlord-tenant, and consumer disputes received only scant attention from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
38 Cf. supra note 14. 
39 ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 353-99. 
40 Ibid., art. 152(1). 
41 Ibid., art. 163(1)(a). 
42 Ibid., art. 152(2). 
43 Ibid., arts. 213-18. Most importantly, article 214(1) provides that: “[t]he court can recommend at 
any time that the parties consider mediation.” 
44 Lugano Convention, supra note 23, art. 50. On the profession of the notary in civil law 
jurisdictions such as Switzerland, see e.g. Schlesinger et al., supra note 5, at 22-24. 
45 ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 347-52. 
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Committee, which brushed it aside with the comment that such a device is foreign to 
Swiss traditions.46
Thus, the new Swiss Code of Civil Procedure remains true to Swiss tradition and 
shows little evidence of transplants from other parts of the world (other than those 
mandated by international treaty). A large portion of the Code is rooted in what is usually 
considered civil law tradition. This is in evidence in the strict separation of private and 
public law litigation (the new Code only applies to the former);47 judge-controlled 
litigation and taking of evidence;48 the absence of juries;49 the absence of common law-
style rules of evidence;50 the absence of motion practice;51 clear delimitation of judicial 
power;52 de-novo appeals; and a small litigation package (limited joinder of parties and 
claims, no US-style discovery, and a narrow bite of res judicata).53 The Code also 
continues the established European tradition of generally charging court costs and the 
winner’s attorney’s fees to the losing party.54
                                                                                                                                                 
46 See Begleitbericht, supra note 28, at 15, 45-46. For more background on the decision to avoid 
introducing class actions in the new Code, see Baumgartner, “Class Actions,” supra note 19, at 309-16. 
47 See e.g. Baumgartner, “Class Actions,” ibid., at 307-08. 
48 See e.g. Martin Kaufmann, “Beweiserhebung durch das Gericht vs. Beweiserhebung durch die 
Parteien” in Geiser et al., Rahmenbedingungen, supra note 7, 657, at 657-58. 
49 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there were proposals for introducing a civil jury in 
various cantons. The Canton of Zurich actually did introduce a civil jury in 1874, but abolished it again in 
1911. See e.g. R.C. van Caenegem, “History of European Civil Procedure” in Mauro Cappelletti, chief ed., 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. 16 (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), The 
Hague: Mouton, New York: Oceana, 1973) 95.  
50 Cf. Schlesinger et al., supra note 5, at 443-45. 
51 Ibid., at 435-36. 
52 See e.g. Baumgartner, “Class Actions,” supra note 19, at 321. 
53 On these matters, see e.g. Samuel P. Baumgartner, “Related Actions” (1998) 3 Zeitschrift für 
Zivilprozess International 203, at 210. In a slight deviation from the depiction in the text, the Code does 
extend the appel en cause, a limited form of third-party complaint, from the French-speaking cantons to the 
rest of Switzerland. See ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 81-82. 
54 Ibid., arts. 104-12. 
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At the same time, however, the new Code displays a number of features with a long 
history in at least some cantonal codes that may be surprising to those who have been fed 
the usual diet of descriptions of civil law procedure. First, most Swiss judges have, for 
centuries, been selected in some form of public or parliamentary election.55 After all, one 
of the major reasons that the various Swiss states sought independence from Habsburg 
from 1291 on was their unwillingness to be subject to far-away judges imposed by the 
empire.56 Although judicial elections in most cantons are usually a matter of internal 
party politics and, thus, rarely involve public election campaigns, the possibility of not 
being reelected or reappointed after the usual 4- or 6-year service period,57 although rare, 
is real.58 Despite this feature, there is, in some cantons, a tradition of a career judiciary of 
sorts in the sense that many lower-level judges begin their careers as long-term judicial 
clerks. From there, they are then elected to a judgeship. In other cantons, a considerable 
number of judges, especially at the appellate level, come to office with at least some 
practical experience outside the judiciary. Since the new Code is leaving the organization 
of the judiciary largely to the cantons,59 none of this is likely to change. 
Along similar lines, there are a few cantons that never gave up the early Germanic 
tradition of public deliberation and vote of the courts at both the first instance and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
55 In three cantons, at least some of the lower-level judges are appointed by the state’s highest court, 
rather than elected. See e.g. Alfred Bühler, “Von der Wahl und Auswahl der Richter” in Heinrich Honsell 
et al., eds., Festschrift für Heinz Rey zum 60. Geburtstag (Zürich: Schulthess, 2003) 521, at 533. 
56 Similarly, the newly independent states soon worked to remove themselves from the jurisdiction 
of the far-away judges imposed by the Catholic Church. On all this, see Emil Schurter & Hans Fritzsche, 
Das Zivilprozessrecht des Bundes (Zürich: Rascher, 1924), at 5-29. 
57 In a number of cantons, the larger political parties use specialized committees to vet a candidate’s 
professional quality. See e.g. Vogel & Spühler, supra note 19, at 87. 
58 A few recent instances in which cantonal and federal judges either almost failed or did fail to be 
reelected because of unpopular decisions have led to renewed questions about whether this system 
adequately protects judicial independence. See e.g. Stephan Gass, “Wie Sollen Richter und Richterinnen 
gewählt werden? Wahl und Wiederwahl unter dem Aspekt richerlicher Unabhängikeit” (2007) 16 Aktuelle 
Juristische Praxis 593. 
59 ZPO, supra note 29, art. 3. 
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appellate levels. All cantons have, however, since been required by federal law to provide 
the parties with a written judgment and opinion in cases that can be appealed to the 
Federal Supreme Court.60 Moreover, written opinions in Switzerland follow the civil law 
tradition of stating only the opinion of the entire court, without any dissents or 
concurrences. Yet, in some cantons, deliberation and vote still occur on the bench in the 
presence of the parties and any members of the public who wish to observe the 
proceedings.61 However, since the cantons that follow the practice of the surrounding 
countries of secret deliberation and vote seem to feel equally strongly about the 
importance of their approach for the integrity of the judicial process,62 the new Code 
leaves the matter up to the cantons to regulate.63 The Code does, however, provide that 
the public is excluded from the entire proceedings in certain matters, including all family 
law cases.64
A third, perhaps unexpected, feature65 of the new Code is the presence of a single, 
concentrated, oral hearing (Hauptverhandlung, audience de jugement).66 I hesitate to call 
                                                                                                                                                 
60 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht of June 17, 2005, SR 173.110, art. 112.  
61 See e.g. Gesetz betreffend die Zivilprozessordnung für den Kanton Bern of July 7, 1918, BSG 
271.1, art. 204 [Code of Civil Procedure of the Canton of Bern]; Zivilprozessordnung of Sept. 11, 1966, 
BGS 221.1, § 53 [Code of Civil Procedure of the Canton of Solothurn; Code de procédure civile du canton 
de Neuchâtel of Sept. 30, 1991, RSN 251.1, art. 333 [Code of Civil Procedure of the Canton of Neuchâtel]. 
62 On the history behind this approach, see e.g. Kurt H. Nadelmann, “The Judicial Dissent: 
Publication v. Secrecy” (1959) 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 415. 
63 ZPO, supra note 29, art. 54(2). 
64 Ibid., art. 54(3), (4). 
65 Cf. Benjamin Kaplan, “An American Lawyer in the Queen’s Courts: Impressions of English Civil 
Procedure” (1969) 69 Mich. L. Rev. 821, at 841: 
What then is the grand discriminant, the watershed feature, so to speak, which shows the 
English and American systems to be consanguine and sets them apart from the German, 
the Italian, and others in the civil law family? I think it is the single-episode trial as 
contrasted with discontinous or staggered proof-taking. This characteristic must greatly 
affect the anterior proceedings that culminate in trial. 
66 ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 228-34. 
 12
COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW AND THE FUTURE OF CATEGORIES 
it a trial only because it is held without a jury and because the judge, in civil law fashion, 
remains in charge of the hearing and of the questioning of the witnesses. Again, this is 
nothing new. Some of the procedural codes of the cantons have provided for this kind of 
main hearing for a long time.67 They therefore made a much clearer break with the 
seemingly endless series of evidentiary hearings in Romano-canonical procedure than did 
the German Code of Civil Procedure of 1877.68 And they did so without relegating the 
taking of evidence to the pre-hearing instruction, as has been the case in French civil 
procedure since 1806.69 In order for a concentrated oral hearing to work, these cantons 
have provided for some form of preliminary hearing beforehand, at which the judge 
encourages the parties to clarify their claims and attempts to identify, with the parties, the 
relevant pieces of evidence, including proposed witnesses.70 If unexpected evidence 
                                                                                                                                                 
67 Article 176(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Canton of Bern, supra note 61, provides:  
If [after the exchange of the pleadings] the instructing judge [i.e., the panel member 
delegated to prepare the main hearing] considers the matter insufficiently clear to permit 
a judgment to be handed down at the time of the main hearing, he summons the parties 
and discusses the case with them in free conversation. He shall make use of his [power to 
ask questions not directly raised by the pleadings], especially by questioning the parties 
so as to clarify contested facts and to encourage them to amend their pleadings [with 
regard to alleged facts and proposed means of proof] accordingly. 
68 Zivilprozessordnung [German Code of Civil Procedure] of Jan. 30, 1877, 1877 RGBl at 83. In the 
United States, Justice Kaplan has coined the term “conference method” to refer to the series of evidentiary 
hearings under the German Code of 1877. See Benjamin Kaplan, “Civil Procedure – Reflections on the 
Comparison of Systems” (1960) 9 Buff. L. Rev. 409, at 410. 
69 See e.g. J. A. Jolowicz, “Civil Procedure in the Common and Civil Law” in Guenther Doeker-
Mach & Klaus A. Zieger, eds., Law and Legal Culture in Comparative Perspective (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Verlag, 2004) 26, at 33-37. 
70 ZPO, supra note 29, art. 226. Unlike many of the cantonal provisions on which this approach is 
fashioned, article 226, as a matter of course, allows the court to conduct several preliminary hearings, at all 
of which evidence may be taken. It thus appears to permit judges from cantons that are used to the German-
style “conference method” to continue that method to some extent. In Germany, in the meantime, the 
reform of 1976 required courts to attempt a single oral hearing whenever possible, which appears to have 
become reality at least in some courts. See e.g. Peter Gottwald, “Civil Procedure Reform in Germany” 
(1997) 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 753, at 761. 
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nevertheless turns up during the main hearing, it is, of course, possible to adjourn that 
hearing. In some cantons, the preliminary hearing is also the time for the judge, more or 
less gently, to suggest settlement—an approach that appears to have made it into the new 
Code.71
Fourth, there are a number of civil law jurisdictions that sustained the prohibition of 
party testimony from Roman Canonical procedure well into the twentieth century on the 
theory that party testimony is notoriously self-serving and, thus, useless as a means of 
proof.72 Not so in a number of Swiss cantons, where parties as well as non-parties have 
long been subject to questioning by the judge. In those cantons, there remains a 
distinction between the testimony of non-parties and that of parties, whereby the latter 
usually cannot result in a perjury charge if a party has intentionally given factually 
incorrect answers.73 Again, the assumption is that parties are likely to at least slant their 
testimony. Technically, the parties are thus not considered witnesses. Nevertheless, the 
drafters of these codes realized that there may still be considerable probative value in the 
testimony of parties.74 The new Code adopts one form of this approach: The parties are to 
be told that they may be subject to a disciplinary fine of SFr. 2000-5000 (approximately 
US $1500-3750) for false testimony.75 However, since they are not technically witnesses, 
the parties cannot commit perjury, with one exception: the court may ask a party to 
respond to specific questions on pain of a perjury charge in the case of false testimony.76 
This is usually done where a point of fact in the knowledge of one party is particularly 
                                                                                                                                                 
71 ZPO, supra note 29, art. 226(2). 
72 See e.g. Dagmar Coester-Waltijen, “Parteiaussage und Parteivernehmung am Ende des 20. 
Jahrhunderts” (2000) 113 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess 269. 
73 See e.g. Vogel & Spühler, supra note 19, at 287. 
74 However, in some cantons, party testimony cannot be used to prove a fact in favor of that party. 
See ibid. In others, as well as in the new Code, it is entirely up to the court to determine the probative value 
of party testimony, whether or not it serves to support that party’s case. Ibid., at 288; ZPO, supra note 29, 
art. 157. 
75 ZPO, ibid., art. 191. 
76 Ibid., art. 192. 
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important to the outcome of the case and the court has no other means to establish the 
truth of that fact.77
Another principle of German common law procedure with considerable staying 
power in Europe is the Roman law rule of nemo contra se edere tenetur (nobody can be 
required to produce a document against himself).78 Accordingly, German procedure did 
not generally permit the judge to order a party to produce a document identified by the 
opponent as being relevant to prove its case until 2002.79 Other European countries got 
rid of the doctrine only a few decades ago, and then only to some extent.80 Again, some 
Swiss cantons abolished this approach long ago.81 Along with these cantons, the new 
Code provides that both parties and non-parties have an obligation to provide evidence in 
their control.82 Parties refusing to live up to that obligation face adverse inferences on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
77 This is, of course, traceable to the old decisory oath under German common law, which 
represented the first step towards permitting party testimony, long before England and the United States 
permitted parties to testify. See e.g. Coester-Waltijen, supra note 72, at 274-76, 277-79. For a description 
of the decisory oath in English, see John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, 3d ed. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), at 119-20; Jolowicz, supra note 69, at 34. 
78 Digest 2, 13, 1 (Ulpian).  
79 See e.g. Oscar Chase et al., Civil Litigation in Comparative Context (St. Paul: Thomson West, 
2007), at 222-26; Gerhard Walter, “The German Civil Procedure Reform Act 2002: Much Ado About 
Nothing?” in Nocolò Trocker & Vincenzo Varano, eds., The Reforms of Civil Procedure in Comparative 
Perspective (Torino: Giappichelli, 2005) 67, at 75-76. 
80 See e.g. Alphonse Kohl, “Roman Law Systems” in Mauro Cappelletti, chief ed., International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. XVI: Civil Procedure, Chapter 6: Ordinary Proceedings in First 
Instance (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,, 1984) 75.  
81 In the Canton of Bern, for instance, the law provides that parties and non-parties alike are required 
to divulge relevant documents in their possession. In the case of non-compliance by a party, the judge can 
make an adverse inference. In the case of non-compliance by a non-party, that non-party faces a fine or a 
prison sentence, and is liable to the party in whose favor the document was invoked for the damage 
incurred. 1918 Civil Code of the Canton of Bern, supra note 61, arts. 235-38. 
82 ZPO, supra note 29, art. 160. 
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merits.83 Non-parties who refuse to cooperate risk a fine as well as being held liable for 
the extra court costs arising from their behavior.84
A final feature of the new Swiss Code that may look familiar to common law 
lawyers, especially from the United States, is its strong emphasis on settlement. This 
feature, too, however, has a long tradition in Switzerland. In this case, the tradition goes 
back to the French Code of Civil Procedure of 180685 and preceding statutes passed right 
after the French Revolution. According to those statutes, the parties had to submit to 
conciliation in front of a justice of the peace before a lawsuit could be filed.86 The idea 
soon caught on in Switzerland.87 However, not all cantons adopted this approach. In 
Geneva, for example, the drafters of the Code of Civil Procedure of 181988 left pre-action 
conciliation voluntary. They did, however, permit the judge to suggest settlement at any 
time during the proceedings, well aware of the dangers of such an approach.89 This 
approach, too, was soon adopted by many cantons. Thus, while most surrounding 
countries only briefly experimented with conciliation and other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution, and did not return to these matters until very recently in their 
                                                                                                                                                 
83 Ibid., art. 164. 
84 Ibid., art. 167. 
85 Code de procédure civile of April 14, 1806, édition originale et seule officielle (Paris: Imprimerie 
Impériale, 1806). 
86 See e.g. Alain Wijffels, “France” in C.H. van Rhee, ed., European Traditions in Civil Procedure  
(Antwerpen: Intersentia,2005) 197, at 197-99 [van Rhee, European Traditions]. 
87 See e.g. Paul Oberhammer & Tanja Domej, “Germany, Austria and Switzerland” in van Rhee, 
European Traditions, ibid., at 215, 218. 
88 Loi sur la procédure civile du canton de Genève of September 29, 1819, reproduced in C. Schaub 
& C. Brocher eds., Loi sur la procédure civile du canton de Genève avec l’exposé des motifs par feu P.F. 
Bellot, professeur de droit (Genève: A. Cherbuliez & Cie., Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher, 4th ed. 1877). 
89 See e.g. C.H. van Rhee, “The Influence of the French Code de Procédure Civile (1806) in 19th 
Century Europe” in Loïc Cadiet & Guy Canivet, eds., De la commémoration d’un code à l’autre: 200 ans 
de procedure civile en France (Paris: Litec, 2006) 129, at 135 [van Rhee, “Influence”]. 
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procedural laws,90 both mandatory conciliation and judge-supervised settlement 
negotiations have been a mainstay in many of the Swiss procedural codes since the early 
nineteenth century.91 Given the long Swiss tradition in this area, it is not surprising that 
the new Code generally requires the parties to bring their case before a “settlement 
authority” before they are permitted to file suit.92 It is equally unsurprising that the Code 
permits the court to suggest settlement at the preliminary hearing stage.93 From here, 
then, it did not require a leap of faith to equally permit the judge to bring up the 
possibility of mediation, an approach for which there is no Swiss tradition.94
As these examples demonstrate, the laws of various Swiss cantons have long shared 
more features with civil procedure in the United States and, to a lesser extent, with other 
common law countries, than traditional descriptions of civil law litigation systems would 
have one believe. Largely, this has been the result of developments unique to Switzerland 
rather than of borrowing from the common law. To me, this is simply further evidence 
that the distinction between common law and civil law procedure has been overdrawn. 
IV. REASONS FOR THE DEARTH OF INTERNATIONAL BORROWING  
IN THE NEW CODE 
With that in mind, it is not, perhaps, too surprising to learn that the only borrowing in 
the new Swiss Code of Civil Procedure is that imposed by international treaty law. 
Nevertheless, one may wonder why the drafters of the new Code failed to adopt any other 
                                                                                                                                                 
90 See e.g. C.H. van Rhee, “Introduction” in van Rhee, European Traditions, supra note 86, 185, at 
185-87; Walter, supra note 79, at 73-74. 
91 The effect of these provisions today depends a bit on how they are handled in practice. In some 
places, such as in the city of Bern, mandatory conciliation sessions are scheduled in 15-minute intervals, 
thus leaving little time for real settlement talks. Other courts have become incredibly successful in getting 
cases settled. Yet lawyers sometimes complain of judicial strong-arming. 
92 ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 197-212. As in the cantonal codes, there are exceptions for certain kinds of 
proceedings. See art. 198. In addition, the parties can agree to forego the conciliation proceeding in cases 
with an amount in controversy of sFr. 100,000 (approximately US $80,000) or more. See art. 199. 
93 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
94 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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features from abroad, while the European Community surrounding Switzerland is in the 
process of harmonizing various aspects of civil procedure, perhaps with the ultimate goal 
of unifying litigation procedure altogether. Obviously, it is difficult to know every reason 
leading to this omission. Having been on the inside of the lawmaking process in 
Switzerland for three years (although not with regard to this project) and having had 
conversations with a number of the members of the Committee of Experts who drafted 
the new Code over time, however, I will try to identify what I gather to be the major 
reasons for the drafters’ inclination to shun borrowing. 
First and foremost, the Committee’s task was to overcome the long history of 
opposition to a federally unified code of civil procedure. For that purpose, the Committee 
had to tread carefully. Departing too much from the rules and concepts known in the 
various cantons simply would have put that mission in danger. Moreover, the 
Committee’s chosen approach of steering clear of controversial new subject matter is in 
line with the requirements of Swiss consensus democracy: Switzerland is a multi-party 
democracy with a government that has been shared by representatives of the four leading 
parties in Parliament since 1959. No party has had control over either Parliament or the 
executive since 1891 or has even had a majority in either institution since 1954. The 
result has been a consensus approach to lawmaking that tends to disfavor bold, new 
ideas.95
The Committee tried to meet this challenge by drawing from the existing cantonal 
codes of civil procedure rather than by imposing new concepts or by adopting a single 
cantonal code.96 That approach immediately brought to light a basic problem. Few Swiss 
lawyers have practiced under the procedural code of more than one canton, and few 
scholars have spent much time comparatively analyzing the procedural laws of the 
various cantons. Indeed, the only comprehensive inter-cantonal comparative study dates 
                                                                                                                                                 
95 See e.g. Jürg Steiner, Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in 
Switzerland, rev. ed., trans. by Asger Braendgaard & Barbara Braendgaard, (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1974). 
96 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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from the early 1930s,97 and even it does not always go as deep as one might wish for the 
purposes of informed decision-making in law reform. As a result, the Committee spent 
most of its time learning about, and discussing, the comparative advantages of the 
procedural rules of the various cantons. Understandably, this left little time for 
international comparative analysis. 
Thus far, the reasons for shunning foreign procedural imports described here—strong 
federalism, first unification in Swiss history, and consensus democracy—are somewhat 
unique to Switzerland. But there are other reasons that are more portable. Recall, for 
instance, that one of the tasks on the Committee’s plate was to consider whether to adopt 
a class action in matters of labour, landlord-tenant, and consumer disputes.98 The 
Committee quickly disposed of that task by concluding summarily that class actions are 
foreign to Swiss traditions.99 The Committee’s conclusion satisfied lawyers, academics, 
and political groups during the public comment period.100 This sentiment was later shared 
during the debates in Parliament.101 Thus, class actions never had a chance of being 
introduced into the new Code. 
There are a variety of jurisprudential, doctrinal, and cultural reasons why class 
actions would be an uneasy fit for the current law of civil procedure in Switzerland.102 
The Committee briefly pointed to some of those reasons in its report.103 But there was 
                                                                                                                                                 
97 See Emil Schurter & Hans Fritzsche, Das Zivilprozessrecht der Schweiz, vol. II/1 (Zürich: 
Rascher, 1931), vol. II/2 (Zürich: Rascher, 1933).  
98 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
99 See Begleitbericht, supra note 28, at 15. 
100 See Zusammenstellung der Vernehmlassungen, Vorentwurf für ein Bundesgesetz über die 
Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) (2004), online: 
<http://www.bj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/staat_buerger/gesetzgebung/zivilprozess.Par.0004.File.tmp/ve-
ber.pdf>, at 96-98. 
101 See e.g. 2007 AB Ständerat 498, at 499 (reassurance by Justice Minister Blocher that introduction 
of class actions was not envisioned in the draft Code). 
102 See e.g. Baumgartner, “Class Actions,” supra note 19, at 310-12, 320-23. 
103 See Begleitbericht, supra note 28, at 15. 
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something else: rejection of the perceived pathologies of US-style litigation. At the heart 
of this rejection is a deep unease with the way in which the jury trial104—a procedure 
steeped in equity,105 anti-formalism, entrepreneurial lawyering, the prospect of punitive 
damages,106 and the tendency towards the lawsuit as a business deal (which the 
aforementioned features support)107—result in a litigation system in the United States in 
which power (including judicial power), money (who has it and who does not), and 
tactics seem to be more important in the outcome of litigation than who is right and who 
is wrong on the merits.108 This unease emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s when what 
the Germans call the ”judicial conflict” with the United States resulted in extensive 
depictions in German law journals of the US litigation system as arbitrary and unfair— 
interestingly unfairness primarily to defendants, but that view should not be surprising, 
                                                                                                                                                 
104 See e.g. Felix Dasser, “Punitive Damages: Vom ‘fremden Fötzel’ zum ‘Miteidgenoss?’” (2000) 96 
Schweizerische Juristenzeitung 101, at 102-103 (speaking of the aleatoric character of US jury decisions). 
105 I am referring here to the “enormous flexibility and latitude of U.S. procedure—including its 
ability to create new remedies, judicial discretion, liberal pleading, the availability of the class action 
device, and the ability of the parties to join every conceivable claim,” as well as to discovery. Samuel P. 
Baumgartner, “Human Rights and Civil Litigation in United States Courts: The Holocaust-Era Cases” 
(2002) 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 835, at 841 [Baumgartner, “Human Rights”]. See also Stephen N. Subrin, “How 
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective” (1987) 
135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909. 
106 Punitive damages are a major source of objection against the US litigation system in Switzerland 
and elsewhere. See e.g. Heinrich Honsell, “Amerikanische Rechtskultur” in Peter Forstmoser et al., eds., 
Der Einfluss des europäischen Rechts auf die Schweiz (Zürich: Schulthess, 1999) 39, at 45-48; Ronald A. 
Brand, “Punitive Damages Revisited: Taking the Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments Too 
Far” (2005) 24 J.L. & Com. 181. 
107 See e.g. Sarah Rudolph Cole, “Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy 
in Dispute Resolution” (2000) 51 Hastings L.J. 1199; Judith Resnik, “Procedure as Contract” (2005) 80 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 593; and William B. Rubenstein, “A Transactional Model of Adjudication” (2001) 89 
Geo. L.J. 371. 
108 See e.g. Baumgartner, “Human Rights,” supra note 105, at 843-46; Burkhard Heβ, 
“Entschädigung für NS-Zwangsarbeit vor US-amerikanischen und deutschen Zivilgerichten” (1999) 44 Die 
Aktiengesellschaft 145, at 149-50. 
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given the reports’ provenance in the US tort reform movement.109 This German 
scholarship has influenced Swiss thinking as well, especially in German-speaking 
Switzerland.110 The perception that US courts were exercising their country’s hegemonic 
power in dealing with foreign parties and foreign sovereignty concerns further supported 
the unease.111
In the late 1990s, objections to US-style class actions further intensified in 
Switzerland in reaction to the Holocaust Assets Litigation, in which several classes of 
Holocaust survivors sued the major Swiss banks for conversion of their families’ bank 
accounts during and after World War II and for other misdeeds.112 Although the cases 
presented a number of difficult legal and factual questions, they were settled, after 18 
months, for $1.25 billion without a single legal ruling by the trial judge.113 In the United 
States, lawyers often see this as an instance in which the class action device helped 
elderly Holocaust survivors receive what was rightfully theirs from intransigent Swiss 
banks.114 In Switzerland, however, where considerable parts of the population had 
initially been sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ claims, the episode was ultimately perceived 
as further evidence that power, including governmental power, is more important than the 
                                                                                                                                                 
109 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, “Is Transnational Litigation Different?” (2004) 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l 
Econ. L. 1297, at 1340-41 [Baumgartner, “Transnational Litigation”]. 
110 Cf. Honsell, supra note 106, at 45-52 (presenting a rather one-sided narrative of US tort law and 
procedure). 
111 See Baumgartner, “Transnational Litigation,” supra note 109, at 1352-53. 
112 For an account of that litigation by one of its protagonists, see Burt Neuborne, “Preliminary 
Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts” (2002) 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 795. For 
an account by the chief US government negotiator in the matter, see Stuart Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice, 
Looted Assets, Slave Labor and the Unfinished Business of World War II (Jackson: Public Affairs, 2003), at 
75-186. 
113 See e.g. Neuborne, ibid., at 805-12. 
114 See e.g. Michael J. Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America’s Courts 
(New York: NYU Press, 2003) at 293-301. 
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merits in resolving class actions in the United States.115 Not surprisingly, then, the 
Committee mentioned, as a reason to reject the adoption of class actions in Switzerland, 
the perceived danger that “baseless claims would be filed for the sole reason of forcing 
the defendant into a settlement.”116 More generally, this episode hardened the conviction 
of many in Switzerland that class actions and other features of US litigation are best 
avoided. 
Most importantly, however, the lack of borrowing in the new Swiss Code of Civil 
Procedure is simply the result of inertia and conservatism in the traditional sense of the 
word.117 Swiss lawyers, as lawyers in many other places, prefer the procedural rules they 
know over those they do not. That is not to say that Swiss lawyers consider their 
respective cantonal codes to be perfect. Indeed, the rate at which most cantons have 
engaged in procedural reform over the past two decades indicates that the opposite is 
true.118 However, most of these reforms have been limited to fiddling with details and 
adapting cantonal codes to newly imposed federal law requirements. Bold changes are 
unlikely to find favor. Similarly, foreign approaches are viewed with suspicion. The 
reason is simple: few lawyers have the necessary knowledge about the ways in which 
foreign solutions work in the intertwined edifice of a foreign jurisdiction’s procedural 
law, let alone about the often unspoken jurisprudential assumptions that underlie the 
application of those solutions, assumptions that  are the result of legal education and 
acculturation in practice.119 The upshot is an unwillingness to consider foreign 
approaches unless there is a very good reason to do so. 
                                                                                                                                                 
115 See e.g. Baumgartner, “Human Rights,” supra note 105, at 847 (noting that “when the $1.25 billion 
settlement became public, a great number of editorialists, members of Parliament, and other protagonists of 
public opinion berated the Swiss banks for selling out to the ‘blackmail’ from overseas”). 
116 Begleitbericht, supra note 28, at 46. 
117 There is nothing particularly Swiss about this phenomenon. See Watson, supra note 4; Alan 
Watson, The Evolution of Law (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), at 119. 
118 See e.g. Sutter, supra note 11, at 124-25. 
119 On this point, see Baumgartner, “Transnational Litigation,” supra note 109, at 1373-75. 
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One way to overcome this inertia, if perhaps not conservatism, is, therefore, to 
provide the necessary in-depth comparative background information on how a particular 
foreign rule or approach works. As I have suggested elsewhere, a powerful means for this 
purpose is the process of negotiating and ratifying treaties, as well as the learning that 
occurs through subsequent practice under those treaties.120 In the present case, article 50 
of the Lugano Convention requires member states to enforce a promissory note 
authenticated by a notary in another member state if the note conforms to the standards 
for such instruments under the law of the originating state.121 Since Swiss law did not 
provide for such an enforceable note, the Swiss negotiators needed to make sure they 
understood this instrument and the way it operated in the countries from which such 
requests for enforcement would be forthcoming before committing to the Lugano 
Convention. They then had to explain the instrument to Parliament for purposes of 
ratification of the Convention. Once ratified, article 50, along with the other provisions, 
were explicated to the practicing bar by both negotiators and scholarly experts in the 
field.122 Soon, monographs on the operation of article 50 and the instrument of the 
enforceable authenticated promissory note appeared.123 In the end, the drafters of the new 
Code had sufficient information on that instrument to consider it worth adopting. 
                                                                                                                                                 
120 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, The Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments: Transatlantic Lawmaking for Transnational Litigation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), at 58-
62, 120-25. 
121 Generally, this means that the notary must draft the document as well as authenticate the 
signatures of the parties for the document to become directly enforceable. See e.g. Jan Kropholler, 
Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht, 8th ed. (Frankfurt: Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, 2005), at 503-04. 
122 See e.g. Franz Kellerhals, “Vollstreckbare öffentliche Urkunden aus schweizerischer Sicht – 
Bemerkungen zur Ausgangslage” (1993) 1993 Der Bernische Notar 1; Monique Jametti-Greiner, “Die 
vollstreckbare öffentliche Urkunde” (1993) 1993 Der Bernische Notar 37; Andreas B. Notter, 
“Vollstreckbare öffentliche Urkunden” (1993) 74 Zeitschrift für Beurkundungs- und Grundbuchrecht 84; 
and Gerhard Walter, “Wechselwirkungen zwischen europäischem und nationalem Zivilprozessrecht: 
Lugano Übereinkommen und Schweizer Recht” (1994) 107 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess 301, at 334-39. 
123 See e.g. Christian Witschi, Die vollstreckbare öffentliche Urkunde nach Art. 50 Lugano-
Übereinkommen in der Schweiz (Bern: Stämpfli, 2000). 
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Another way to overcome inertia consists in forcing change from outside of a 
country’s legal elite. Within the European Community, for example, the Commission has 
been pushing unification in one specific area of transnational litigation after another.124 
Similarly, the European Court of Justice has declared invalid a number of rules of 
domestic civil procedure that discriminate against residents of other member states of the 
Community.125 This has led to a significant increase in research and scholarship in 
comparative procedure as well as to increased legislative activity in order to implement 
the required changes within the member states.126 These forced changes have led to 
increased borrowing among the member states of the Community. They may even end in 
a European code of civil procedure, as some have suggested.127 Of course, Switzerland is 
not a member state of the EC and, thus, has not actively participated in these changes. But 
it has ratified a number of international treaties in matters of procedure, which the 
drafters of the new Code had to implement. 
Finally, during the public comment period of the proposed Code, none of the voices 
of public policy criticized the drafters for failing to borrow approaches from abroad.128 
                                                                                                                                                 
124 See “Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters,” online: <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/legis/latest/chap1920.htm>. 
125 See e.g. Hayes v. Kronenberger, case C-23/95, 1997 E.C.R. I-1718; Mund & Fester v. Hatrex 
International Transport, case C-398-/92, 1994 E.C.R. I-467; Hubbard v. Hamburger, case C-20/92, 1993 
E.C.R. I-3790. On these legislative and case law developments, see Gerhard Walter & Fridolin M.R. 
Walther, International Litigation: Past Experiences and Future Perspectives (Bern: Stämpfli, 2000), at 7-
35. 
126 See e.g. Burkhard Heß, “The Integrating Effect of European Procedure Law” (2002) 4 European 
Journal of Law Reform 3; Astrid Stadler, “Das Europäische Zivilprozessrecht – Wie viel Beschleunigung 
verträgt Europa?” (2004) 24 Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2. 
127 See e.g. Walter & Walther, supra note 125, at 46. See also Konstantinos D. Kerameus, “Political 
Integration and Procedural Convergence in the European Union” (1997) 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 919, at 924-28 
(describing efforts to unify civil procedure in Europe). 
128 There were two exceptions. The University of Geneva criticized the decision not to adopt a class 
action and the University of Zurich more generally lamented the obvious lack of international comparative 
work behind the proposed draft. See Zusammenstellung der Vernehmlassungen, supra note 100, at 97-98, 
76. Neither, however, pushed its views further in the political process. 
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The one exception was that of mediation firms forcefully complaining about a lack of 
reference to mediation. In response, the drafters changed the proposed Code 
accordingly.129 This suggests that politically active groups, too, can support or overcome 
standard inertia in this area. The fact that the conduct of transnational litigation by 
lawyers and judges in the United States led to an unwillingness in Switzerland to consider 
features of US civil procedure as worth emulating seems to further support this 
suggestion.130
V. CONCLUSION 
Today, examples of cross-border borrowing in procedural lawmaking are easy to 
find. In various European Union countries alone, academic publications are abuzz with 
comparative scholarship suggesting the adoption of this or that rule in domestic 
procedure. Even in England, which is not bound by article 65 of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community131 and the many reform proposals imposed by Brussels under 
its authority, the Wolf Committee was not shy to borrow from abroad to find solutions to 
identified problems with English civil procedure.132 Taking a step back from these recent 
developments, however, it should be clear to anyone with a passing interest in the 
comparative history of litigation procedure that cross-border borrowing in this area is 
nothing new. It may even be as old as procedural law itself. Robert Millar, for instance, 
traces US discovery and other features of equity procedure to early Roman Canonical law 
on the European Continent, and other features of US procedural law to early Germanic 
procedure.133
                                                                                                                                                 
129 See supra text accompanying note 43. 
130 See supra text accompanying notes 102-116. 
131 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Consolidated Version, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37. 
132 Lord H. Wolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System 
in England and Wales (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1996). 
133 See e.g. Robert Wyness Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective (New 
York: New York University Law Center, 1952), at 27-28, 201; Robert Wyness Millar, “The Mechanism of 
Fact Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure” (1937) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 261, at 266-76. For this 
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The interesting question, therefore, is not whether there is borrowing, but when and 
why it occurs. One plausible suggestion is that this is mostly a matter of ideas, whether or 
not those ideas respond to a specific need of a particular society.134 But if so, why do 
some ideas travel, while others do not, or only to some countries? For instance, the 1806 
Code of Civil Procedure of France,135 however flawed, influenced a great number of 
procedural codes on the European Continent at the time.136 Is this because the 1806 Code 
was shaped to some extent by ideas of the French Revolution? Or because it simply 
contained ideas whose time had come? If the latter, why was it widely borrowed from 
and not the 1667 Code Louis, on which it was largely based? From this perspective, it is 
interesting to look at the recent Swiss Code of Civil Procedure and ask about the reasons 
why its drafters largely shunned foreign influences—unless required or suggested by 
international treaty—and opted instead for inter-cantonal borrowing. To me, the Swiss 
example suggests that cross-border borrowing in civil procedure depends not only on the 
strength of ideas, but also on an understanding of how particular approaches work within 
the litigation system from which to borrow, as well as on the identity and the strength of 
the interests of politically active groups. Either way, the traditional inertia in this area can 
be overcome by externally forced change.137
Another thing I think the foregoing look at Swiss civil procedure demonstrates is that 
the distinction between common law and civil law systems has often been overdrawn. 
The frequent focus in the common law world on two or three “representative” civil law 
jurisdictions in the study of comparative procedure has helped to identify differences and 
to provide useful perspective. At the same time, however, it has led to generalizations that 
do not withstand further scrutiny. As demonstrated above, procedure and court 
organization in various Swiss cantons have long differed in considerable respects from 
                                                                                                                                                 
purpose, it helps to remember that early chancellors were clerics with a staff of clerics, all well versed with 
Roman Canonical Law. See von Caenegem, supra note 49, at 45. 
134 See Watson, supra note 4, at 100. 
135  See supra note 86. 
136 See e.g. van Rhee, “Influence,” supra note 89. 
137 See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text. 
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the stories that usually emanate from the focus on two or three countries. Those different 
Swiss approaches seem to be more closely related to features of the US litigation system, 
although none of them were borrowed from the common law world. Those who study 
instances of convergence in procedural law may want to take this into account in defining 
their point of departure. 
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